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platforms challenge more moderate incumbents. This paper analyses the im-
pact of economic growth on the support for extreme political platforms. We
provide a theoretical argument in favor of growth e￿ects (as opposed to level
e￿ects) on the support for extreme political parties and we empirically inves-
tigate the relationship between growth and extremist votes. Lower growth
rates bene￿t right-wing and nationalist parties, but do not have a robust
positive e￿ect on the support for communist parties. Our estimates indicate
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11 Introduction
Over the last decades, political parties with extreme platforms challenged
more moderate incumbents in many western democracies (see Figures 1 and
2). Such extreme platforms rarely gained large vote shares, but frequently
their success a￿ected the political positions of more moderate parties - and so
political outcomes. This paper analyses the impact of economic growth on the
support for extreme political platforms. We provide a theoretical argument
in favor of growth e￿ects (as opposed to level e￿ects) on the support for
parties with extreme political platforms and we empirically investigate the
relationship between growth and extreme votes.
It is not straightforward to de￿ne ￿ in economic terms ￿ what an extreme
political platform is. Our view of extremism applies to countries in which
there is some democratic competition amongst a few long term incumbent
parties and where competition is limited to only a small subset of the entire
policy space. In many democratic countries, there seems to exist a broad
consensus about what constitutes such a set of decent policies - i.e. policies
that only redistribute resources among the members of society within certain
bounds.1 In this context, we call an entrant’s political platform extreme
if it includes major di￿erences in the distribution of resources compared to
standard policies. In practice, such extreme political platforms often propose
to redistribute resources away from speci￿c subgroups of society (such as the
rich, ethnic minorities, or citizens of speci￿c regions).
Our analysis is based on the observation that extreme parties are fre-
quently perceived to create more uncertainty about future policy outcomes
than established parties. One reason for this is that extreme parties often
have little or no government experience. Another reason may be that, once a
political movement based on an extreme platform has come to power, the po-
litical elite may de￿ne new - and di￿erent subgroups of society that become
the subject of redistribution. Historically, many regimes that were based on
an extreme political agenda had the feature that some groups of society - be
it ethnical, educational or professional - were stigmatized and su￿ered from
redistribution or oppression.2
1For related theoretical analyses see Artale and Gr￿ner (2003), and Gr￿ner (2007).
2Frequently, extreme political parties with a small membership basis attract a large
number of dissatis￿ed voters. The interaction of these voters and the party members
is hard to predict. This adds to the uncertainty about the political consequences of an
electoral outcome.
2The choice of such a regime comes along with a cost when no group that
bene￿ts today can be really sure that this will stay so in the future. In the
long run, this creates an income risk for all citizens and a trade-o￿ between
short-run gains from redistribution and long-run losses due to increases in
income uncertainty. Economic growth increases the cost of uncertainty and
so increases support for a moderate regime.
In the ￿rst part of the paper we develop a simple game theoretic model
that further analyzes these e￿ects. The purpose of the model is twofold.
First, it shall give reasons for why economic growth and not just the level of
income may have an impact on the support for moderate political regimes.
Second, it shall provide testable comparative static results about the deter-
minants of political radicalism.
In our model, extreme political parties o￿er short-run gains from redistri-
bution to many individuals. However, the same individuals also face long-run
losses due to more instability and higher income risk. Only su￿ciently poor
agents are in favor of extreme policy platforms. The model permits a compar-
ative static analysis with respect to several variables of interest. The growth
rate is associated with a higher cost of future income risk. This reduces the
number of voters in favor of extreme policies. Similarly, a higher discount
factor raises the vote share of moderate platforms. The share of stigmatized
agents has ambiguous e￿ects on the support for the moderate regime. On
the one hand, it increases revenues from redistribution, on the other hand,
stigmatized agents favor moderate policies. Moreover, the scope for future
expropriation may also be a￿ected. Economic inequality raises the support
for redistribution and it also a￿ects the e￿ect of changes in economic growth.
An important prediction of our model is that the e￿ects of economic
growth on the support for an extreme political party depends on the perceived
likelihood that this party will generate unstable policies that a￿ect di￿erent
ethnic, regional or religious subgroups of society over time. If policies are
perceived as stable - in the sense that the same groups of society remain
priviledged, political support of this party is una￿ected by growth.
In the empirical part of our paper we construct a panel dataset for 16
OECD countries that includes survey-based measures of political support for
right-wing/nationalist parties and communist parties. We use this data to
approximate the support for extreme political platforms. We apply rigor-
ous panel data techniques to estimate the impact that economic growth has
on the share of voters who favor such platforms. Any attempt to investi-
gate the relationship between growth and the support for certain policies
3is plagued by causality problems - support for di￿erent policies is likely to
shape institutions and institutions are likely to a￿ect growth. We address
this causality issue by using instrumental variable techniques and panel ￿xed
e￿ects regressions. Speci￿cally, we use both system-GMM estimation as well
as international oil price shocks as instrumental variables to deal with endo-
geneity issues. We deal with unobservable cross-country heterogeneity and
common year shocks by using country and time ￿xed e￿ects.
Our main ￿nding is a negative and signi￿cant e￿ect of real per capita
GDP growth on the support for extreme political parties. At the same time,
our analysis also makes clear that even major changes in the GDP per capita
growth rate will most likely not change the political outcome in any of the
OECD economies substantially. According to our estimates, a one percentage
point drop in real per capita GDP growth would on average increase the share
of extreme right-wing political parties by roughly one percentage point. In
most economies this is unlikely to have any lasting impact on the political
outcomes.
It is particularly noteworthy that there is a di￿erential e￿ect of growth
on left-wing and right-wing extremism. There is a clear e￿ect on the support
for extreme right-wing parties whereas we ￿nd little evidence on the support
for communist parties. To the extent that communist parties mainly wish
to redistribute from the rich to the poor, this is in line with our theoretical
predictions.
Our paper is related to a literature that investigates the relationship of
economic development and political outcomes. For a long time, social scien-
tists have argued that income and democracy go hand in hand. Two di￿erent
kinds of theoretical arguments have been made in favor of a positive relation-
ship between income and democracy. The ￿rst class of explanations concerns
a possible causality that goes from income to democracy. 3 The most popular
one is that a higher income level enables an emerging middle class to success-
fully ￿ght for political emancipation. 4 The second set of arguments concerns
3See for example Geddes (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), Glaeser et al. (2004), Ace-
moglu et al. (2008, 2009), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), or Br￿ckner and Ciccone
(2010) among others. For earlier contributions, see Lipset (1959) or Huntington (1991).
4There is little theoretical or empirical work on the relationship of growth and voting
outcomes. One exception is De Neve (2010), who attempts to relate the US median voter’s
preference for the size of the government sector to economic growth. In his model agents
only derive utility from changes in private and public consumption. With an appropriate
utility function, all voters prefer a higher tax rate when income growth is higher. The
4the inverse causal direction. According to this view, democracy has a posi-
tive impact on economic freedom and so creates a higher living standard. A
synthesis of both views has recently been proposed by Persson and Tabellini
(2009). They argue, that voters learn from the economic performance of
their political system. Citizens are only willing to defend democracy if they
believe in its economic bene￿ts. A switch from democracy to an autocratic
regime is more likely when the system performs poorly in economic terms.
This implies that old democracies are likely to have higher levels of GDP
whereas new democracies can start with a low level of GDP.
Most of the above arguments focus on the relationship between the level
of output and democratic institutions. However, some economists also argue
that economic growth is another independent and major determinant of the
support for and development of a democratic political system. This point
has recently been raised by Benjamin Friedman (2003). Friedman argues
that only a continuous improvement of individual living standards provides
the ground for a sound functioning of a democratic system and for the devel-
opment of a more open political system. One of the reasons Friedman gives
why individuals are more content with the political system if they experience
improvements of their living standards is that individual well being is linked
to income growth and not just the level of income.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the theoretical model. Sections 3 and 4 describe the dataset and estimation
strategy. Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple theoretical framework
2.1 The moderate regime
Consider a population of i = 1;:::;n individuals who live in periods t =
0;:::;1. In every period, the economy is in one of two possible political
regimes, the moderate (M) and the extreme one (E). In regime M, all indi-
viduals have a given income, ~ yit, that grows with a constant growth rate:
~ yit = g





~ yi0 =  y0: (2)
model has nothing to say though about the support for extreme political positions.
5An individual’s income under the moderate regime should be thought of as
the market income corrected through ￿standard￿ redistributive measures such
as a progressive income tax system.
All individuals are risk averse and care about discounted utility derived





with u0 (yt) > 0;u00 (yt) < 0. More speci￿cally, in order to obtain closed form
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i0: (5)
In regime M, in each period individuals may support one of the two
regimes in a vote. Either they support the existing regime M or they vote
for regime E. In what follows we consider an extreme case where this policy
turns the system into a persistent political regime that is characterized by
high income uncertainty.
2.2 Regime E
At the beginning of each period, nature randomly selects a subset S of the
sn individuals that are stigmatized. In each period, every individual knows,
whether he or she belongs to the set S or not. In regime E all incomes ~ yi are
collected by the state (who also observes S) and redistributed evenly across





1 sgt y0 if i = 2 S
0 if i 2 S
: (6)
For simplicity, we assume that agents have no choice in an extremist
regime; i.e. such a regime persists. Permitting the return to the moderate
6regime would not a￿ect our results. Discounted expected utility of agents in


































+ (1   s)
1   y
0
1   g: (9)
The parameter s captures the relative importance of redistribution from stig-
matized to non-stigmatized agents relative to income redistribution from rich
to poor. When s = 0, the extreme regime merely redistributes income from
rich to poor. When s > 0, there is also redistribution from stigmatized to
non-stigmatized agents.
2.3 Equilibrium
A strategy of an agent maps the history of the game into a voting decision.
Without restricting generality, we consider the optimization problem of an
agent in period 0. An agent who is not stigmatized in period 0 prefers the
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The same condition applies to all further periods. Therefore, players have the
following weakly dominant strategies. All agents with initial income ~ yi0  (<
)Y support (oppose) regime M in all periods, independently of whether they
are stigmatized in period t or not. Stigmatized agents with initial income ~ yi0
support regime M if
1
1   g ~ y

i0  0 + g
 (1   s)
1   y
0
1   g , ~ yi0 > Y
0 := 
1




7Otherwise, they support regime E. Note that, for appropriate parameters
, g, , and s the threshold level Y is below the initial average income
 y0. Therefore, societies in which the median of the income distribution is
below the mean need not necessarily turn into an extreme political regime.
Moreover, as one can easily verify, the threshold income Y 0 above which
stigmatized agents prefer the status quo always lies below Y if g < 1. This
condition must hold for the discounted sum of utilities to exist.
2.4 Results
Our simple theoretical model produces a number of useful results. 5
1. A higher discount factor increases support for the moderate regime
because agents care more about the future income risk.
2. A higher growth rate increases support for the moderate regime because
it increases the variance of future income in an extreme political regime.
3. A higher individual income raises an individual’s support for the mod-
erate regime.
4. Consider an alternative distribution of income at date zero that pre-
serves the income ratio ~ yi0= y0 for all individuals. It follows from (12)
and (13) that all individuals favour the moderate regime if and only if
they did so under the old income distribution. Hence, ceteris paribus,
the initial average income  y0 does not a￿ect the political outcome.
5. Inequality (measured by the share of individuals who earn less than Y )
reduces support for the moderate regime.
6. Consider a uniform distribution of initial income with a given mean.
Inequality reduces the marginal e￿ect of growth on the support for
regime M.
7. The share of stigmatized agents in the population s has an ambiguous
e￿ect on the support for the moderate regime. If  = 1=g then a
higher share s reduces the threshold for income above which agents
who are not stigmatized support the moderate regime.
5The results follow directly from conditions (12) and (13).
88. When s=0, there is no e￿ect of growth on the support for regime E.
This means that the support for a regime that merely redistributes from
the rich to the poor does not change when the growth rate increases.
In our empirical analysis that follows, we mainly concentrate on the e￿ect of
economic growth on the support for extreme political platforms (the second
theoretical result). We also present some ￿rst empirical evidence on the role
of level e￿ects (result 4) and the role of inequality for the marginal e￿ect that
economic growth has on the support for extreme political parties (result 6).
Moreover, in relation to result 8, we compare the e￿ects of economic growth
on the support for left-wing and right-wing parties. 6
3 Description of the OECD Vote Share Dataset
We constructed a semi-annual panel dataset comprising 16 OECD countries
for the period 1970-2002. 7 Our main measure for the rise of extreme polit-
ical parties is from Eurobarometer. 8 Eurobarometer conducted from 1970
to 2002 semi-annual surveys of individuals’ voting intentions in OECD coun-
tries.9 The question asked in the Eurobarometer survey was the following: ￿If
6We have also made an attempt to test result 5 by looking at the cross-country cor-
relation between measures of income inequality (as well as measures of poverty) and the
support for extreme political platforms. We did not ￿nd a signi￿cant relationship, which
may be due to the insu￿cient number of cross-country observations (16) in our OECD
dataset. We have also made an attempt to test hypothesis 5 with panel data, using the
labor income share as a proxy for income inequality. Our main ￿nding was that increases
in the labor income share are associated with a signi￿cant within-country decrease in the
support for extreme political platforms, which is consistent with result 5. Results are not
reported here for space purposes and are available from the authors upon request. Note
that due to lack of data on country-speci￿c discount and stigmatization factors, we are
unable to test the other results from the model.
7The countries (time-period) covered in our dataset are: Austria (1994-2002), Bel-
gium (1970-2002), Denmark (1973-2002), Finland (1993-2002), France (1970-2002), West-
Germany (1970-2002), Great Britain (1973-2002), Greece (1980-2002), Ireland (1973-
2002), Italy (1970-2002), Luxembourg (1973-2002), Netherlands (1970-2002), Norway
(1990-1995), Portugal (1985-2002), Spain (1985-2002), and Sweden (1994-2002).
8The data is publicly available at http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.
9The average survey size was 1088, with an interquantile range of [1000, 1049]. Note
that because the surveys were taken randomly across individuals, changes in the voter
participation rate which may be due to changes in GDP per capita growth does not posit
a concern for our estimation strategy.
9there were general elections tomorrow, which party would you vote for￿. We
then constructed three variables that proxy the support for extreme politi-
cal platforms in a country-period. The ￿rst variable proxies the support for
right-wing/nationalist parties. This variable is constructed by summing over
all the votes given to right-wing/nationalist parties (right-wing/nationalist
parties are identi￿ed according to the ZEUS party code) and dividing these
votes by the total number of votes in the survey. The second variable proxies
the support for communist parties. This variable is constructed by summing
over all the votes given to communist parties (again identi￿ed according
to the ZEUS party code) and dividing these votes by the total number of
votes in the survey. The third variable proxies the total support for extreme
political parties and is constructed by adding the vote shares obtained by
right-wing/nationalist parties with the vote shares obtained by communist
parties.
Basic summary statistics of the vote share of extreme political parties in
our sample are as follows. The mean vote share of right-wing/nationalist
parties is 0.016. The between-country standard deviation is 0.031 and the
within-country standard deviation is 0.016. The interquantile range is [0,
0.026]. 5% of all the right-wing/nationalist vote shares are larger than 0.08
and the sample maximum is 0.15. For communist parties, the mean vote
share is 0.041. The between-country standard deviation is 0.044 and the
within-country standard deviation is 0.025. The interquantile range is [0,
0.071]. 5% of all the communist vote shares are larger than 0.156 and the
sample maximum is 0.222.
Note that the vote share of extreme political parties is heavily positively
skewed. Once we demean the vote share from its country-average and the
common time ￿xed e￿ect the skewness disappears however. This is shown in
the kernel density plot of Figures 3 and 4.
To present also some speci￿c examples of the empirical evolution of the
vote share of extreme political parties we plot in Figures 1 and 2 time-series
graphs of the right-wing/nationalist vote share and the communist vote share
for 4 of our 16 OECD countries (Denmark, Italy, West-Germany, and France).
These graphs show that there is substantial variability in the vote share of
extreme political parties, both across time as well as across countries in
a given time period. For example, while the average vote share of right-
wing/nationalist parties in Denmark was around 8 percent in the 70s, 3
percent in the 80s, and 4 percent in the 90s, in West-Germany the vote
share of right-wing/nationalist parties was around 0.3 percent in the 70s,
100.9 percent in the 80s and 2.5 percent in the 90s. In Italy the vote share
of right-wing/nationalist parties was around 4 percent in the 70s, 3 percent
in the 80s, and 7 percent in the 90s; in France it was around 0 percent in
the 70s, 2 percent in the 80s, and 4 percent in the 90s. For the communist
parties, the share of votes obtained in Denmark was around 6 percent in the
70s, 11 percent in the 80s, and 10 percent in the 90s. In West-Germany the
share of votes obtained by communist parties was around 0.5 percent in the
70s, 0.3 percent in the 80s and 0.5 percent in the 90s. In Italy the share of
votes obtained by communist parties was around 14 percent in the 70s, 16
percent in the 80s, and 14 percent in the 90s; and in France it was around 8
percent in the 70s, 6 percent in the 80s, and 5 percent in the 90s.
4 Estimation Strategy
We use the following econometric model to estimate the e￿ect that real per
capita GDP growth has on the vote share of extreme political parties:
V otesharec;t = ac + bt + cGrowthc;t 1 + uc;t,
where ac and bt are country and time ￿xed e￿ects that capture country-
speci￿c unobservables and time-speci￿c common shocks respectively. uc;t
is an error term that is clustered at the country level to allow for arbi-
trary within-country serial correlation. As a baseline regression we use least-
squares to estimate the e￿ect that (lagged) real per capita GDP growth has
on the vote share of extreme political parties. Note that for our least-squares
estimator to provide a consistent estimate of the e￿ect that lagged per capita
GDP growth has on the vote share of extreme political parties it is neces-
sary that real per capita GDP growth does not systematically respond to
future changes in the share of votes obtained by extreme political parties.
Stated di￿erently, this assumption boils down to current investment and la-
bor market decisions being independent of future, predictable changes in the
political system. This may be a rather strong assumption that we address
econometrically in two ways.
First, we consider using system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond,
1998) to estimate a dynamic version of the above equation that uses the
lagged vote share as a right-hand-side regressor. Including the lagged vote
share on the right-hand side implies that the residual variation in the vote
11share which correlates with per capita GDP growth is not predictable by
agents that use past vote shares to forecast future vote shares. Hence, changes
in the current vote share are surprise changes that cannot be predicted by
past vote shares. Because these surprise changes cannot be systematically
predicted by past vote shares they are less likely to systematically a￿ect past
per capita GDP growth due to anticipation e￿ects.
As a second approach to deal with endogeneity issues, we consider in-
strumental variable techniques that use international oil price shocks as an
instrument for real per capita GDP growth. Because the e￿ects of interna-
tional oil price shocks on real per capita GDP growth are dependent on
whether a country is an oil importer or an oil exporter, we construct a
country-speci￿c oil price shock series as Oilshockc;t = 4Log(OilPricet)c,
where 4Log(Oilpricet) is the log-change of the international oil price (ob-
tained from IMF statistics) and c is the country-speci￿c average share of
(net) oil exports in GDP (obtained from OECD statistics). Note that we
explicitly use a time-invariant net export share to ensure that our oil price
shock variable re￿ects only time-speci￿c movements in the international oil
price and not time-speci￿c movements in countries’ export-shares. For our oil
price shock variable to be a valid instrument we therefore need that country-
speci￿c (future) changes in the vote share of extreme political parties do not
systematically a￿ect (current) changes in the international oil price. This
condition will be satis￿ed as long as output growth in each OECD country
does not signi￿cantly a￿ect changes in the international oil price. Or stated
di￿erently, that each of our 16 OECD countries is a price taker on the inter-
national oil market. According to the International Energy Agency none of
our countries has an export or import share that exceeds 5% of total world
oil production so changes in the demand or supply of oil to the international
oil market which are due to changes in the vote share of extreme political
parties in a speci￿c OECD country are likely to have only a negligible e￿ect
on the international oil price.
5 Main Empirical Results
Table 2 presents our baseline estimates of the e￿ect that real per capita GDP
growth has on the vote share of right-wing/nationalist parties. In column
(1) we show the estimates of a least squares regression that does not control
for country or time ￿xed e￿ects. The obtained coe￿cient on per capita
12GDP growth in this pooled least-squares regression is negative (-0.071) and
statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. In column (2) we add the level
of per capita GDP to the right-hand-side of the estimating equation. In line
with our theoretical predictions from Section 2, the corresponding coe￿cient
on GDP per capita is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. Moreover, the real
per capita GDP growth rate continues to have a highly signi￿cant negative
e￿ect on the support for extreme right-wing/nationalist parties.
In column (3) we add country ￿xed e￿ects to account for potential un-
observable cross-country heterogeneity. This leaves our point estimate on
real per capita GDP growth mostly unchanged. Controlling in column (4) in
addition to the country ￿xed e￿ects for also time ￿xed e￿ects which capture
unobservable shocks common across OECD countries does however make our
point estimate increase in absolute size substantially. The point estimate is
-0.136 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. Economically, the
estimate implies that a one percentage point decrease in real per capita GDP
growth of the prior two quarters increases the vote share of extreme right-
wing/nationalist parties in the following period by about 0.136 percentage
points.
As an identi￿cation check we run in column (5) a false experiment that
includes future per capita GDP growth conditional on past per capita GDP
growth in the estimating equation. A signi￿cant point estimate on future per
capita GDP growth could indicate endogeneity problems as a past change in
the vote share could a￿ect current GDP per capita growth. We ￿nd however
that future per capita GDP growth conditional on past per capita GDP
growth does not enter the estimating equation with a statistically signi￿cant
sign and that quantitatively the point estimate on future per capita GDP
growth is rather small. Moreover, we ￿nd that lagged per capita GDP growth
continues to have a statistically signi￿cant negative e￿ect on the vote share.
In column (6) we also document that per capita GDP growth shocks averaged
over the past two years have a signi￿cant negative e￿ect on the vote share,
pointing towards persistence in the e￿ects that past GDP per capita growth
shocks have on current voting behavior.
To check whether our linear speci￿cations miss out on important non-
linearities in the relationship between real per capita GDP growth and the
vote share of extreme right-wing/nationalist parties we show in Figure 5 non-
parametric local polynomial estimates. The nonparametric local polynomial
estimates allow for a ￿exible functional relationship between real per capita
GDP growth and the vote share of extreme right-wing/nationalist parties.
13The estimates are computed using an Epanechnikov kernel, with bandwidth
selection based on cross-validation criteria. As can be seen, there is a clear
downward sloping relationship between real per capita GDP growth and the
vote share of extreme right-wing/nationalist parties over the entire range of
real per capita GDP growth. Moreover, the 95% con￿dence bands indicate
that the linear relationship implicitly assumed in our estimating equation
cannot be rejected.
In Table 3 we present system-GMM estimates that take into account
dynamics in the vote share of extreme right-wing/nationalist parties. The
estimated AR(1) coe￿cient on the vote share is 0.66 and this indicates quite
persistent dynamics in our dependent variable. Column (1) also shows that
the point estimate on lagged per capita GDP growth in the dynamic panel
regression is negative and statistically signi￿cant just like in the static panel
regression. Note however that the interpretation of the point estimate on the
lagged per capita GDP growth variable is slightly di￿erent in the dynamic
panel regression from the interpretation of the point estimate on the per
capita GDP growth variable in the static panel regression because (residual)
changes in the vote share are in the dynamic panel regression surprise changes
that cannot be forecasted by past changes in the vote share. 10 As column
(1) shows, the estimated coe￿cient on lagged per capita GDP growth is -
0.062 and has a t-value of -2.46. The point estimate therefore implies that
a permanent decrease in the growth rate of 1 percentage point increases the
vote share of extreme right-wing/nationalist parties by over 0.18 percentage
points in the long-run. On the other hand, a purely transitory growth shock
increases the vote share of extreme right-wing/nationalist parties by 0.06
percentage points on impact and then slowly converges towards zero over
time. In column (2) we repeat the exercise using the average real per capita
GDP growth rate over the past two years and ￿nd similarly to the static
panel estimates that past growth shocks have a signi￿cant negative e￿ect on
the vote share.
In Table 4 we further address the issue of possible endogeneity bias in our
estimating equation by using international oil price shocks as instrumental
variables. The two-stage least squares estimate in column (1) produces a
point estimate on lagged per capita GDP growth of -0.998 that is statisti-
cally signi￿cant at the 1% level. Despite being quantitatively larger than
the corresponding least-squares estimate of column (3) in Table 2, a formal
10Higher order lags of the vote share are not statistically signi￿cant.
14Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the least-squares estimate
is equal to the IV estimate. The ￿rst stage F-statistic for the two-stage least
squares estimate is around 11.9 so that the maximum relative IV bias is less
than 10% according to the tabulations in Stock and Yogo (2005). Moreover,
the Hansen J-test does not reject the validity of past oil price growth shocks
as instrumental variables for per capita GDP growth. In column (2) we also
compute the two-stage least squares estimate for the average real per capita
GDP growth rate over the past two years. The ￿rst stage F-statistic for this
two-stage least squares regression is about 30 and hence easily exceeds the
critical values for weak instruments. In the second stage, we obtain a point
estimate on lagged per capita GDP growth of -0.374 that is statistically sig-
ni￿cant at the 5% level. Again we tested the validity of our instruments and
did not ￿nd evidence that they are systematically correlated with the second
stage error.
In Table 5 we report estimates of the e￿ect that economic growth has
on the support for communist parties. Our model predicts that the growth
e￿ects depend on the stability of redistributive measures over time that voters
associate with di￿erent parties. We ￿nd that the two-stage least squares
estimates, reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 do not yield a signi￿cant
e￿ect of economic growth on the vote share obtained by communist parties. 11
According to our theory, an explanation for this di￿erential e￿ect could be
that voters perceive communist parties as being more clearly in favour of
redistribution along conventional lines ￿ i.e., from rich to poor ￿ than right-
wing/nationalist parties. Note that while the Hausman test does not reject
that the least squares estimates reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5
are signi￿cantly di￿erent from the instrumental variables estimates reported
in columns (1) and (2) the least squares estimate in column (3) is barely
signi￿cant at the 10% level and that the least squares estimate in column (4)
is not signi￿cant at any conventional con￿dence level.
In Table 6 we report the overall e￿ect that economic growth has on the
support for extreme political platforms. The two-stage least squares esti-
mate in column (1) of the e￿ect that economic growth has on the combined
variables of right-wing/nationalist and communist vote shares is -0.548 (sig-
ni￿cant at the 1% level). This estimate implies that a decline of growth by
three percent would, on average lead to an increase of the vote share of ex-
11The corresponding system-GMM estimates, not reported here for space purposes, are
also insigni￿cant.
15treme political parties of at most two percentage points. Column (2) shows
that the two-stage least squares estimate of the e￿ect that economic growth
has on the support for extreme political platforms is also negative when using
the real per capita GDP growth rate averaged over the past two years but
the t-value in this case is only -1.04 and hence not signi￿cant. On the other
hand, the respective least squares estimates reported in columns (3)-(4) of
Table 6 are both negative and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level
at least.
According to our theoretical analysis in Section 2, more income inequal-
ity should be associated with a smaller e￿ect of growth on the support for
extreme political parties. In Table 7 we test for the impact of inequality on
the marginal e￿ect that economic growth has on the support for extreme
political parties by ordering the countries in our data set according to their
median-to-mean income ratio (net of taxes and transfers) and then splitting
them into two subsamples with an equal number (8) of countries. Panel A of
Table 7 reports the least squares and instrumental variables estimates for the
sample with the highest median-to-mean income ratio; Panel B reports the
estimates for the sample with the lowest median-to-mean income ratio. 12 As
can be seen, the e￿ect of GDP per capita growth on the support for extreme
political parties is quantitatively larger and statistically stronger in the group
of countries with high median-to-mean income ratios (low inequality) than
in the group with low median-to-mean income ratios (high inequality). This
result is consistent with our theoretical prediction of a dampening e￿ect of
greater income inequality on the marginal e￿ect that economic growth has
on the vote share of parties with extreme platforms. 13
12The median median-to-mean after-tax income ratio in Panel A is 0.92; in Panel B the
median median-to-mean after-tax income ratio is 0.83. The datasource is OECD (2009)
statistics.
13While we can reject at conventional con￿dence levels that the estimates of column
(2) of Panel A are signi￿cantly di￿erent from the estimates of column (2) of Panel B,
this is not the case for the other speci￿cations. Applying the sample split to the right-
wing/nationalist parties yields a 2SLS coe￿cient on economic growth for the low inequality
countries of -1.57 that is signi￿cant at the 1 percent level, and a 2SLS coe￿cient for the
high inequality countries of -0.04 that is insigni￿cant. For the communist parties the 2SLS
estimates are insigni￿cant and quantitatively small regardless of whether we consider the
high inequality sample or the low inequality sample. We have also checked the robustness
of our results to using the Cameron et al. (2010) multi-cluster estimator. This yielded
very similar t-values to the ones reported here when standard errors were clustered at both
the country and the period level.
166 Conclusion
Many observers believe that the standard of living and the distribution of
income are major determinants of the political support for radical political
platforms. Our empirical analysis suggests that economic growth is an im-
portant and independent determinant of political radicalism: a lower growth
rate increases the support for extreme political platforms.
There are good reasons to believe that industrialized countries’ per capita
GDP is likely to grow less strongly in the coming decades. Demographic
developments impose limits on GDP per capita growth and increasing prices
for raw materials make the production in those countries more expensive.
The current ￿nancial crisis has led to the largest drop in per capita GDP
of industrialized countries since the 1930s and the necessity to reduce levels
of public debt and the so called for regulation of the ￿nancial system may
have long-lasting adverse e￿ects on real per capita GDP growth. If Benjamin
Friedman is right with his hypothesis, political outcomes could be a￿ected
signi￿cantly in those economies (see also Miegel, 2009).
The empirical results in this paper instead show that it is unlikely that
even strong recessions can change political outcomes. Even a signi￿cant drop
of the GDP per capita growth rate of three percentage points would increase
on average the vote share of the extreme parties considered in our sample
by less than two percentage points. Such an increase in the vote share will
most likely not change the political outcome in any of the OECD economies
substantially.
Our present analysis may be extended into several directions. As the
data become available, it is desirable to extend the empirical analysis to
developing countries and to other historical episodes. 14 All of the OECD
countries in our sample are democracies with a strong historical record of
democracy, and it would be interesting to see whether results also hold in
countries that have had little to no experience with democracy. Moreover,
14In the Appendix we have made an attempt to include developing countries in our
empirical analysis by using data provided by the Database of Political Institutions (Beck
et al., 2001) on the number of seats received by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest party in
parliament. The Database of Political Institutions codes whether the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
largest party in parliament has nationalist origin, but unfortunately does not provide
information on the number of seats obtained by more minor parties (to which nationalist
parties often belong). The Appendix discusses further the pros and cons of using the
Database of Political Institutions for our empirical purposes and also presents estimation
results.
17our theoretical analysis points out that there may be other determinants of
political extremism that should be studied empirically as well as the data
become available. One may also extend the theoretical framework to permit
di￿erent growth e￿ects of di￿erent political regimes. In particular, adaptive
expectations about growth rates may lead to an interesting dynamic rela-
tionship between growth and the political regime. Multiple equilibria may
obtain when extreme political regimes grow little which makes individuals
believe, that redistribution through the continuation of an extreme political
regime is the best way to secure a high living standard.
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20Appendix. Results Using the Database of Polit-
ical Institutions
In this appendix we discuss the use and estimation results for an alterna-
tive dataset: the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). The
Database of Political Institutions provides information on the number of seats
obtained by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest political party voted into parliament
and records whether political parties are nationalist. A key requirement for
coding a party as nationalist in the Database of Political Institutions is that
a primary component of the party’s platform is the creation or defense of a
national or ethnic identity. According to the Database of Political Institu-
tions examples that fall into the ￿nationalist￿ category are parties that have
fought for independence, either militarily or politically; parties that advo-
cate the persecution of minorities; or parties that are listed as xenophobic.
One clear advantage of the Database of Political Institutions is that it covers
a much larger sample of countries than our OECD dataset (180 countries
for the period 1975-2006). However, a major disadvantage of the Database
of Political Institutions for the purpose of our empirical analysis is that the
Database of Political Institutions only provides information on the number of
seats obtained by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest political party in parliament.
In particular, the database does not provide information on the actual vote
share obtained by nationalist parties. For many countries extreme right-
wing/nationalist parties only receive a small share of the total number of
votes and are therefore not represented as the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd largest party
in parliament.
To show what happens when using the information provided by the
Database of Political Institutions we present in Appendix Table 1 system-
GMM estimates where our dependent variable is the number of seats obtained
by a nationalist party in parliament (given that the nationalist party is the
1st (alternatively, 2nd or 3rd) largest party in parliament). 15 Overall we
￿nd that there are signi￿cant negative e￿ects of past real per capita GDP
growth (real per capita GDP growth data are from the Penn World Tables,
version 6.3, Heston et al. 2009) on the number of seats received by a nation-
alist party if the nationalist party constitutes the 2nd or 3rd largest party in
15Note that the variable is 0 if the 1st (alternatively, 2nd or 3rd) largest party in par-
liament is not a nationalist party. The variable is missing if no information was provided
on the number of seats received.
21parliament (see columns (2) and (3)). For the case of the nationalist party
already constituting the largest (i.e. ruling) party in parliament we do not
￿nd a statistically signi￿cant e￿ect of past per capita GDP growth on the
number of seats that the nationalist party received (see column (1)). These
results are consistent with the results that we obtained from the survey based
vote shares of radical parties in our OECD dataset. Nevertheless, we believe
that for purposes of examining empirically how economic growth a￿ects the
support for extreme political parties the survey based vote shares are more
suitable than the information provided by the Database of Political Institu-
tions on the number of seats obtained by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest party
in parliament.
22Table 1. Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Vote Share of Right-Wing / Nationalist Parties (Eurobarometer) 0.016 0.027 610
Vote Share of Communist Parties (Eurobarometer) 0.041 0.052 610
Share of Net Oil Exports in GDP (OECD Statistics) -0.013 0.033 610
GDP Per Capita Growth (OECD Statistics) 0.012 0.054 610
Mean-to-Median After Tax Income Ratio (OECD Statistics) 1.145 0.062 610
GDP Per Capita (OECD Statistics) 16588 11462 610
Table 2. GDP Growth and the Rise of Right-Wing/Nationalist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS LS LS LS LS LS










GDP Level, t-1  -6.60x10
-8
(-0.17)
GDP Growth, t+1 -0.030
(-0.84)
Average GDP 






0.086 0.086 0.086 0.156 0.156 0.186
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. The t-values listed in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
country level. The dependent variable is the share of survey votes received by right-wing / nationalist parties. *Significantly different from zero at 90 
percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.







GDP Growth, t-1 -0.062**
(-2.46)
Average GDP Growth, t-1 to t-4 -0.025***
(-2.01)
AR (2) Test, p-value 0.122 0.106
Sargan Test, p-value 0.166 0.127
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 530 530
Note: The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-values shown in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the share of survey votes received by right-wing / nationalist parties. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
24Table 4. GDP Growth and the Rise of Right-Wing/Nationalist Parties
(1) (2)
2SLS 2SLS
GDP Growth, t-1 -0.998***
(-3.69)
Average GDP Growth, t-1 to t-4 -0.374**
(-2.42)
First Stage F-stat 11.898 30.938
Hansen Overid. Test, p-value 0.2145 0.8597
Hausman Endogeneity Test, p-value 0.5802 0.4902
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 610 610
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The t-values shown in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered 
at the country level. The instrumental variables are the t-2 to t-4 oil price growth rate weighted by the country-specific (time-invariant) net export share of 
oil in GDP (see Section 4 for a detailed description of the instrument). The dependent variable is the share of survey votes received by right-wing / 
nationalist parties. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Table 5. GDP Growth and the Rise of Communist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS LS LS








First Stage F-stat 11.898 30.938 . .
Hansen Overid. Test, p-value 0.353 0.732 . .
Hausman Endogeneity Test, p-value 0.334 0.584 . .
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 610 610 610 610
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1) and (2) is two-stage least squares; columns (3) and (4) least squares. The t-values shown in parentheses are 
based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variables are the t-2 to t-4 oil price growth rate weighted by 
the country-specific (time-invariant) net export share of oil in GDP (see Section 4 for a detailed description of the instrument). The dependent variable is 
the share of survey votes received by communist parties. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 
percent confidence.
25Table 6. GDP Growth and the Rise of Extreme Political Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS LS LS








First Stage F-stat 11.898 30.938 . .
Hansen Overid. Test, p-value 0.479 0.811 . .
Hausman Endogeneity Test, p-value 0.850 0.536 . .
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 610 610 610 610
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1) and (2) is two-stage least squares; columns (3) and (4) least squares. The t-values shown in parentheses are 
based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variables are the t-2 to t-4 oil price growth rate weighted by 
the country-specific (time-invariant) net export share of oil in GDP (see Section 4 for a detailed description of the instrument). The dependent variable is 
the sum of the share of survey votes received by right-wing/nationalist parties and communist parties. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
26Table 7. GDP Growth, Inequality, and the Rise of Political Extremism
Panel A: 8 OECD Countries With Highest Median to Mean Income Ratio (Low Inequality)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS LS LS










First Stage F-stat 63.704 61.059 . .
Hansen Overid. Test, p-value 0.8895 0.5257 . .
Hausman Endogeneity Test, 
p-value
0.3750 0.9191 . .
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253 253 253 253
Panel B: 8 OECD Countries With Lowest Median-to-Mean Income Ratio (High Inequality)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS LS LS










First Stage F-stat 9.705 2.918
Hansen Overid. Test, p-value 0.707 0.523
Hausman Endogeneity Test, 
p-value
0.290 0.242
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 357 357 357 357
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1) and (2) is two-stage least squares; columns (3) and (4) least squares. The t-values listed in parentheses are 
based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variables for the two-stage least squares estimation are the t-
2 to t-4 oil price growth rate weighted by the country-specific (time-invariant) net export share of oil in GDP (see Section 4 for a detailed description of the 
instruments). The dependent variable is the share of survey votes received by right-wing / nationalist parties and communist parties. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
27Appendix Table 1. GDP Growth and the Rise of Political Extremism
(Database of Political Institutions)
1st Largest Party  2nd Largest Party 3rd Largest Party
(1) (2) (3)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM






































Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3466 1293 742
Note: The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-values listed in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of seats in parliament that are obtained by a nationalist party if 
the party constitutes the 1st largest party in parliament; column (2) the number of seats in parliament that are obtained by a nationalist party if the party 
constitutes the 2nd largest party in parliament; the number of seats in parliament that are obtained by a nationalist party if the party constitutes the 3rd 
largest party in parliament. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
28Figure 1. Time-Series Plots of the Vote Shares of Right-Wing / Nationalist Parties
Source: Eurobarometer. The figure is based on answers to the question: “If there were general 
elections tomorrow, which party would you vote for”. Right-wing/nationalist parties are 
classified according to the ZEUS party code.
Figure 2. Time-Series Plots of the Vote Shares of Communist Parties
Source: Eurobarometer. The figure is based on answers to the question: “If there were general 
elections tomorrow, which party would you vote for”. Communist parties are classified 
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Germany FranceFigure 3. Kernel Density Plot of Demeaned Vote Shares of Right-Wing / Nationalist Parties
Note: The figure shows an Epanechnikov kernel density estimate of the vote share of right-
wing / nationalist parties. The vote share has been demeaned from the country and time fixed 
effect.
Figure 4. Kernel Density Plot of Demeaned Vote Shares of Communist Parties
Note: The figure shows an Epanechnikov kernel density estimate of the vote share of 
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Demeaned Vote Share of Communist PartiesFigure 5. Per Capita GDP Growth and Vote Shares of Right-Wing / Nationalist Parties
Note: The figure shows nonparametric local polynomial estimates (based on an Epanechnikov 
kernel) of the relationship between the share of votes obtained by right-wing / nationalist 
parties and lagged per capita GDP growth. Both the share of votes obtained by right-wing / 
nationalist parties as well as lagged per capita GDP growth have been demeaned from the 
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95% CI Nonparametric Local Polynomial Estimate